At the top of the hill was a sunken road in which we could see several of our men waiting for others to come up to them. Doubling across the intervening space amidst the fire from a tank gun and the machine guns of Lamotte Farm, we were fortunate in joining the occupants of the sunken road without a single casualty Here we found all that was left of the 19th and 20th Battalions which had survived the attack so far. The officers then called a hurried council of war to decide what course was to be followed next. A count of the 20th disclosed that we had remaining some 95 men and about six officers, whilst the 19th were slightly stronger. It was eventually decided after some heated discussion that the 19th men were to remain in possession of their present position in the Torrens canal and sunken road, and the 20th were to move obliquely to the right rear and form a kind of defensive flank in the Torrens Canal opposite Lamotte Farm and with our right resting on the recently captured Beaurevoir System of trenches. (P.S. See Official History of A.I.F. 1918 – Lt. Cameron, Lt. Anthony, Lt. W.H.Elkington in Council of War.)

The decision to halt thus and to make no further advance towards the village of Beaurevoir was made because we had discovered our weakness and also that our right flank was well in the “air.” It transpired afterwards that in the first stages of the attack the 17th and 18th who were to have kept touch with the 19th and 20th were held up by an immensely strong redoubt within four hundred yards of their point of departure. We, happily, possessed over 18 machine guns and as every man in the battalion could use a Lewis gun, the whole strength of the battalion was divided into Lewis gun sections and were told off on to posts along the Torrens Canal for as great a distance as possible. Thus we remained all day on October 3rd, our tanks had both come to grief and one of the “mud-hook“ was on fire and in a state of destruction near by astride the open-dut of the dry Torrens Canal. There was still a big gap between our right flank and the next troops on our right which fact gave us much concern. With more men or given a few Stokes mortars, we could have very soon reduced the garrison in Lamotte Farm.

But we lacked either of these, so for the remainder of the day we lay in our position in a state of defence with a gap between us and our right of over 1,000 yards. By 3 pm this gap was closed and at dusk we witnessed the splendid spectacle of the 23rd Btn moving through our line to take up positions in front from whence they moved on to Beaurevoir at dawn. The 5th Brigade including the 20th were then withdrawn and marched back through the village of Estrées to dugouts in a sunken road on the outskirts.

It had been a hard days fighting for our Brigade as we had been called on to attack on too big a front for our bayonet strength, the 20th having gone into action that day with barely a strength exceeding 350 men of all ranks. The attack however had proved quite successful since the whole of the divisional objectives were taken before the 2nd div was withdrawn. Our battalion had lost very heavily but we had performed our work and had taken over 200 prisoners.

We remained in our positions as a reserve to the 23rd btn all that day, occupying “funk” holes dug in the sides of the sun- ken road near Estrées. The enemy aircraft paid our sector several visits during the day and the following night, paying a great deal of attention to our roads lined with transport, guns and other traffic. They did us little damage, however, and beyond putting one or two horses out of action, the most objectionable feature of their frequent visits being the ear piercing crashes of the falling and exploding bombs as they burst nearby. Within a few yards of our camp was an anti-aircraft gun, manned by an English crew, which opened up rapid fire whenever the Hun planes paid a visit within range. This gun with others, though not registering any hits managed to get rid of great quantities of ammunition and caused a tremendous noise which is about all that could be said about any anti—aircraft gun. They were guns which fired a shrapnel shell of about 12 lbs. at the rate of about 15 to 18 or even more per minute and were mounted on a swinging plate form in such a manner that any part of the sky could be peppered and the course of the plane followed as it moved up above. The crews were highly trained to come into action immediately, getting the ranges almost at once. The gunners very rarely ever obtained a direct hit, however, the main object being to combine fire with other guns in the neighbourhood in order to make an aerial barrage through which it was highly dangerous for the enemy aircraft to fly, thus driving it back before it was able to obtain photographs or do any observation etc. besides bomb dropping.

During the succeeding day, reports reached us that the 6th Brigade, aided by the 5th Brigade had captured Montbrebain and the supporting trenches and posts in the neighbourhood, whilst Manchester regiment had taken Beaurevoir the enemy being in a great hurry to get away, and in a badly disorganised state. However, it was reported that the Huns were more dangerous a little to the right in the Joncourt region, which was also held by the 6th Brigade and the 2nd Pioneer Battalion and as it was thought possible that the enemy may attempt to make a counterattack, the remainder of the 5th Brigade, including the 20th were moved to a position on the right rear of Joncourt in case there should be any trouble. We were placed in trenches which were part of the Beaurevoir System and which had been captured by the British troops who had attacked the day before with us.

The usual concrete pillboxes or dugouts built into the trenches were here much in evidence. The Hun had fared badly as a result of yesterdays attack by the “Tommies” with tanks, there was ample evidence to show. The dead lay about in large numbers and near one pillbox I counted the bodies of twenty two dead Germans, who had been killed by a tank in attempting to escape from a pillbox. Nearly every other concrete pillbox, the scene was similar, with a few bodies of English attacking troops as well.

All day long we remained in reserve in this system of trenches with very little happening to cause us any alarm. We were situated near the crest of a ridge and on looking back, the landscape presented the usual scene of feverish energy on the part of the artillery and transport who were digging into new positions or conveying ammunition and supplies to the new front. Towards dusk we received orders to prepare to be relieved so that we were ready to move out when at about 10 pm we handed over our positions to the 40th American Division which was to continue the pursuit of the Huns for the next few days. We then marched to the rear again and returned to the dugouts and shelters we had vacated that morning. Our advanced troops were by now passing through villages occupied by French civilians who gazed in wonder at the Australian hats. These poor captives were treated with the greatest tenderness by the soldiers who had at last released them from the bondage of the Huns and it was only a matter of a few more hours before they and the populations of several more villages were at last repatriated as the Hun retreated in disorder.

Early next morning, I received instructions to report to our Battalion headquarters, which I did and was ordered to report to Brigade headquarters, which was then situated at Bellicourt in the open cut near the Tunnel. I had scarcely left Battalion headquarters when I was knocked down by a flat piece of wood which fell after being hurled up in the air by a 5.9 which fell near by. That was the last shell I heard explode during the war. On reporting back to Lt. Timmins at Brigade Headquarters, I was given a horse and was instructed to proceed to Divisional headquarters as billeting officer for the 20th Battalion, since the division had been placed in reserve and was to be sent back to the Abbeville area for a prolonged spell.